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Does a monetary union need fiscal shock absorbers helping the participating countries to cope with
asymmetric shocks? The consensus in the debate over EMU argues that the answer is yes. In this paper,
we revisit the issue, building on a dynamic, general equilibrium framework of regions in a monetary union
exposed to asymmetric shocks. We show that inter-regional taxes and transfers can stabilize regional
employment or consumption, but not both. The welfare effects of such stabilization are, however,
ambiguous. In contrast to a popular argument in the EMU debate, inter-regional taxes and transfers do
not reduce the incentives for goods and labor market deregulation in the regions, provided that the
degree of trade integration among the regions is large. There is, however, reason to coordinate regional
reform policies to avoid adverse effects on the aggregate performance of the union.
JEL codes: E42, E63, F33, F42








vonhagen@united.econ.uni-bonn.de1Note that the Report was considering a monetary union among a smaller and less
heterogeneous group of countries than the current members of EMU; that is, it would likely have
recommended an even larger budget knowing who the current members are.
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I. Introduction
Monetary union implies the loss of the exchange rate as an instrument of adjustment
to asymmetric shocks affecting the participating countries. Beginning with  Robert Mundell’s
seminal contribution (1961), the literature on monetary union has argued that  countries
forming a monetary union need adequate fiscal policy tools to provide the proper adjustment
to asymmetric shocks. This argument also runs through the debate over European Monetary
Union (EMU). The MacDougall Report (Commission 1977), a study on the feasibility of EMU
in the 1970s, suggested that adjustment to asymmetric shocks affecting regions sharing a
common currency typically works through the budget of a central or federal government
collecting taxes from and paying transfers to these regions. The Report concluded that a
monetary union in Europe would need a significant budget at the union level to fulfill this role.
Specifically, it recommended a Community budget of seven percent of Community GDP, much
larger than the current 1.3 percent.
1 Similarly, the Delors Report  (1989) argued that EMU
needed powerful fiscal shock-absorbers to deal with asymmetric shocks to the member states.
Delors was later joined by eminent macro economists in the US such as Feldstein,  who
predicted that EMU would soon collapse in the absence of a fiscal mechanism absorbing
asymmetric shocks. More recent contributions to the debate over EMU in the 1990s have cast
the argument into a framework of regional insurance against asymmetric shocks and proposed
that the EMU should be vested with a system providing automatic transfers from regions
enjoying relative prosperity to regions in relative distress. Recognizing that any significant
increase in the European Commission’s budget is politically infeasible, this approach proposes
the creation of a European-wide unemployment insurance or of a system of fiscal equalization2Länderfinanzausgleich is a system of horizontal transfers among the states of the Federal
Republic designed to reduce differences in the annual per-capita revenues from the main taxes of
the states.
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patterned after Germany’s Länderfinanzausgleich
2 instead. The automatic and non-
discretionary nature of such a system would also raise the credibility of the promise to make
transfers to regions in distress, an important aspect of any arrangement among sovereign
nations.
Mundell’s original argument can be summarized follows. Consider two economies with
fixed wages and prices producing two output goods which are not perfect substitutes. Assume
that output demand exogenously falls in one country and rises in the other, leaving aggregate
output the same. In Mundell’s Keynesian scenario, output and employment falls in the first and
rises in the second country. With two currencies and a flexible exchange rate, the currency of
the first country depreciates, and the implied decline in the relative price of its output helps
smooth the recession  in the first and the boom in the second country. With a fixed exchange
rate, however, this relative price effect disappears, and the divergence in economic stance
between the two countries becomes larger.  This could be avoided by channeling demand from
the second to the first country through the public sector, e.g., by increasing taxes in the second
and spending the proceeds in the first. In terms of the Keynesian model, this would amount
to an inward shift of the IS curve in the prospering country and an outward shift in the country
facing a recession. With a proper choice of taxes and expenditures in the two countries, the
adjustment mechanism of the flexible exchange rate could be emulated. 
Much of the debate over this issue in the context of EMU has focused on the empirical
question, how important fiscal mechanisms absorbing asymmetric shocks are in existing
monetary unions. This literature, reviewed in section 2 of this paper, has now converged on
an apparently puzzling result. Fiscal flows in existing monetary unions react much less to
asymmetric shocks affecting regional output than Mundell’s argument seems to suggest. In
contrast, the debate of the last 40 years has accepted Mundell’s basic framework of analysis.3
This is significant, as the macro economic model underlying his reasoning, a Keynesian world
of fixed wages and prices in which output is determined by demand and supply has no role to
play, has long been rejected. Von Hagen (1998) analyzes the properties of regional insurance
against asymmetric shocks in a static, neo-Keynesian rational-expectations framework. In that
framework, regional insurance may exacerbate fluctuations of output and employment over
time and interfere with macro economic stabilization at the union level. Obviously, this casts
some doubts on the desirability or regional insurance against asymmetric shocks. 
Surprisingly, the analysis of the economics of EMU in the 1990s has paid little attention
to the question how Mundell’s proposition stands up in a modern macro economics framework.
Exceptions are Kletzer and Buiter (1997) and Kletzer (1999), who use dynamic general
equilibrium models based on optimizing decisions with capital accumulation and perfect
competition to analyze the role of fiscal transfer schemes as a replacement for nominal
exchange rate flexibility.  In this paper, we consider how transfer schemes affect welfare under
monetary union in a dynamic general equilibrium with optimizing households and firms and
nominal wage rigidities. Specifically, section three of the paper presents a model of a monetary
union whose regions are affected by asymmetric shocks. Section four uses this model to
analyze the properties of an interregional transfer system channeling demand from regions
enjoying a positive to regions suffering from a negative shock. An important aspect of this
model is that we allow for asymmetries not only in the shocks but also in the economic
propagation mechanisms of the regions pertaining to the monetary union. This has
consequences for the macro economic performance of the union as a whole in the presence
of asymmetric shocks.
The debate over regional insurance has raised the objection that automatic transfers
among regions reduce the incentives of the regional governments to undertake policies of
economic reform increasing the ability of their regions to cope with asymmetric shocks (e.g.,
Migué, 1993; Persson and Tabellini,1996). Persson and Tabellini  argue that the4
implementation of regional insurance in a monetary union might call for a program of union-
financed conditional grants to overcome such disincentives. In section five of this paper, we
address this issue by asking what is the relation between structural reform policies at the
regional level and a system of interregional transfers. Section six concludes. 
II. Regional Insurance Against Asymmetric Shocks: International Evidence
Much of the recent literature on regional insurance against asymmetric shocks has
focused on the US and asked how much regional insurance the federal tax and transfer
system provides in that context.  Table 1 summarizes the main results of that research.  The
numbers indicate the estimated increase, measured in cents, in the net transfers received by
a state or region in response to a one-dollar decline of the state’s or region’s income relative
to US average. 
The MacDougall Report looked at the issue of fiscal insurance by asking to what extent
does the federal fiscal system reduce income differences between US states. The same
question is asked in Sachs and Sala-i-Martin (1991). Both find that the federal fiscal system
provides a large offset against regional income disparities, with estimates ranging between 28
and 40 percent.
Von Hagen (1992) first pointed out that the empirical analysis of regional insurance
must distinguish between permanent redistribution reducing lasting income differences
between regions, and temporary transfers providing insurance against asymmetric shocks.
This is because the context of replacing the exchange rate mechanism for adjustment
suggests that the focus should be on insurance against temporary shocks. Adjustment to
permanent asymmetric shocks, in contrast, remains possible through other adjustment
channels even in the presence of a fixed exchange rate, albeit that the speed of adjustment
might be slower. Table 1 shows that the insurance effect of the federal tax and transfer system
is, indeed, substantially lower than suggested by the MacDougall Report or by Sachs and Sala-5




von Hagen 47 10
Atkeson, Bayoumi  7
Goodhart, Smith 15 13
Gros, Jones  4-14 
Bayoumi, Masson  7-22 7-30 
Mélitz, Zumer  16 12-20 
Asdrubali et al.  13 
Sorensen, Yosha 15
Fatas  11 
Obstfeld, Peri 19 10
Athanasoulis, van
Wincorp
20 10  
Note: Entries indicate the estimated (range of) net federal
transfers received by a region in response to a 1-dollar
difference in the level or change in state income or product
compared to US average income or product.
Table 1: Estimates of Federal Intranational 
Redistribution and Insurance in the US
i-Martin,  while the
redistributive effect is large.
 Subsequent papers
have generally accepted the
distinction between
redistribution and insurance or
regional stabilization and come
out with estimates that are
closer to von Hagen’s (1992)
results. Mélitz and Zumer
(1997) compare estimates
based on state income and
estimates based on gross
state products as the measure
of regional economic activity.
They find that the insurance
effect associated with gross-
state-product estimates tends to be lower than the effect associated with state-income
estimates. Conceptually this raises the difficulty that state incomes include incomes earned
from economic activities outside the state. Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (1998) estimate the
stabilizing role of the federal fiscal system at time horizons of different lengths. They find that
the federal fiscal system reduces the standard deviation of changes in state incomes by about
ten percent at an horizon of 1-2 years, and by 15 percent on average over all horizons.  
   In sum, the empirical studies of the 1990s confirm that there is a significant fiscal
insurance against asymmetric shocks provided by the federal fiscal system in the US. While
there is still some disagreement about the size of the insurance, the empirical evidence clearly6
suggests that such insurance is of much smaller magnitude than the redistributive effect of the
federal fiscal system, and that the insurance does not offset much more than 10 cents on a
dollar change in state income caused by an asymmetric shock. 
  Several studies have
presented similar estimates
for countries other than the
US. Table 2 summarizes
these results. Canada is an
obvious study object in the
context of EMU; it was
included also in the
MacDougall Report. It is of
particular interest, because







reducing differences in the
standards of living between
Canadian provinces by
compensating the poorer
provinces for their less prosperous tax bases. According to Canadian legal tradition,





Goodhart, Smith 12 - 19
Mélitz/Zumer 18 14






von Hagen et al. 0 0.03
Italy
MacDougall 47
Obstfeld, Peri 8 3
UK
Goodhart, Smith 21
Mélitz/Zumer 29 21  
Note: Entries indicate the estimated (range of) net federal   a
region in response to a 1-dollar difference in the level or
change in state income or product compared to US average
income or product.
Table 2: Estimates of Central Government Intranational
Redistribution and Insurance in Other Countries 3One difficulty with the Canadian equalization system is that it is designed to bring  relatively
poor provinces up to a standard defined by the average per capita revenues of Ontario, British
Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Quebec (Courchene, 1999). Under the rules of the system,
Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario do not receive equalization payments at all, the remaining
provinces that are included in the standard receive a partial offset for a revenue short fall, and those
not included in the standard receive full offset for a decline in revenues. At the same time, a poor
province receives a transfer when revenues in the provinces included in the standard increase, even
if the economy of that province performs like the Canadian average. This shows the emphasis on
redistribution rather than intranational insurance. 
7
  The MacDougall Report estimated that the Canadian federal system reduces income
differences between provinces by 32 cents per dollar. Bayoumi and Masson, in contrast, 
estimate an insurance of 14 cents to the dollar, and put the redistributive effect of the
Canadian system at 39 cents to the dollar.  Other studies agree with the magnitude of the
intranational insurance in Canada, but provide more different estimates of the redistributive
effect.
3
Recent literature has also evaluated intranational insurance in France, Germany, Italy,
and the UK. The results show a surprising degree of variation across countries. Mélitz and
Zumer (1997) and Goodhart and Smith (1993) obtain similar estimates for the UK, where fiscal
insurance seems somewhat larger than in Canada and the US. Mélitz and Zumer and Pisani-
Ferry et al (1993) find that fiscal  insurance is  much larger in France than in North America.
While this might suggest that fiscal insurance is generally larger in unitary than in federal
states,  Obstfeld and Peri (1998) show  that fiscal insurance is tiny in Italy. Thus, the existing
evidence allows no clear-cut conclusions about the importance of federal insurance in federal
compared to unitary states.  Von Hagen et al. (1999) find no insurance against asymmetric
shocks provided by the German Länderfinanzausgleich, and a significant albeit small
redistributive effect.
In sum, the empirical evidence shows that fiscal insurance against asymmetric shocks
is a significant part of existing monetary systems.  But the size of the insurance can be very
different in different countries, and there is no empirical evidence to answer the question how
important it is in practice for the stabilization of the regional economies. 8










III. A Macro Model of Regional Shocks in a Monetary Union 
In this section, we set up a macro economic model of two regions forming a currency
area. Each region produces an output good for consumption using a set of intermediate input
goods produced with labor supplied by the residents of that region. Output goods are traded
between the two regions in perfectly competitive markets; they are imperfect substitutes in
consumption. In contrast, intermediate goods are not traded between the regions; they are
supplied by monopolistically competitive producers. One may think of these intermediate goods
as production-related services. Wages in each region are sticky in the sense of being
determined at the beginning of a period and remaining constant throughout. In this setting
output is demand determined in the short run, and the adoption of a common currency impacts
real economic performance.  The regions are populated by consumers characterized by their
intertemporal consumption and labor supply choices. Governments in each region collect lump
sum taxes used to finance the production of a regional public good. The two regions share the
same currency and an integrated money market as well as an integrated bond market.
Call the two regions “home” and “foreign,” respectively. Subsequently, we mark
variables pertaining to the foreign region with a “*” and suppress time indexes where possible
without creating ambiguities. The home region uses an infinite number of intermediate goods,
qj indexed j 0 [0,1], and a technology of the CES type, to produce its output good, y,
In equation (1), “a”  denote regional productivity, which will be subject to stochastic  shocks
later on. Each intermediate good is produced using labor and a linear technology, 










































where pj and p1 are the domestic prices for intermediate goods of type j and of the domestic
output good, respectively. The zero-profit condition for the output good yields the price of this
good as a function of output prices, 
Intermediate goods producers operate under conditions of monopolistic competition and set
prices with a fixed mark-up over wages, pj = , w. Similar equations hold for the foreign
economy.
Household preferences are given by the intertemporal utility functions
In equation (5), c is the composite consumption index determined from a CES-type
instantaneous utility function
where ( is the share of home goods in expenditures, 2 is the elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign goods in consumption, and ci is the quantity of good i consumed by the
household. We assume symmetry in the preferences in the sense that the expenditure share
of good i=1 in the home region equals the share of good i=2 in the foreign region. Equation
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Furthermore, in equation (5), G is real government spending in the home region, M
denotes the cash balances held by the household, and l is the household’s labor supply.
Government expenditure is divided between home and foreign goods in the same way as
private consumption.  Households buy and sell nominally indexed bonds denominated in the
common currency, and pay nominal lump sum taxes pt Tt. Their budget constraint is
Here, it is the one-period nominal interest rate, and Bt are profits earned by the firms. All profits
are distributed to households. Utility maximization yields the following demand conditions,
The first line determines household savings as a function of the interest rate. The second line
determines the choice between the two output goods depending on their relative prices. The
third line gives money demand as a function of the nominal rate of interest and current
consumption spending. The home region’s government faces the budget constraint pG = pT.
With flexible prices, we also have the labor supply function11
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The marginal utility of leisure is decreasing, " > 1. Labor demand by intermediate-goods
producers is given by
Similar conditions hold for the foreign economy.
In equilibrium, we have the market clearing conditions for the two final goods, 
where ci denotes home consumption of region-i goods and ci
* denotes foreign consumption of
region-i goods. Furthermore, we have the clearing conditions for the money market and the
bond market,
We can now analyze the effect of asymmetric productivity shocks on the equilibrium
for the two regions. Subsequently, we assume that wages are sticky in the sense of being set
at the beginning of a period, while employment is demand-determined. We linearize the model
around its steady state  equilibrium and obtain the reactions to the asymmetric shocks. The
linearized output market equilibrium condition, assuming that government spending does not
change, is
Next, domestic money demand becomes12
St ’ ˆ p1t%ˆ y1t&(ˆ pt%ˆ ct) ’ ˆ Bt%1% 6
1&$
ˆ Mt . (16)
ˆ Bt%1 ’ ˆ p1t%ˆ yt&(ˆ pt%ˆ ct)& 6
1&$
ˆ Mt (17)
ˆ p1t ’ &ˆ p2t ’ &ˆ a; ˆ pt ’ &(2(&1) ˆ a. (18)
where r is the real interest rate. Corresponding equations hold for the foreign region, together
with the condition that the deviations of money demand from steady state must sum to zero.
Next, we have domestic savings,
Note that the deviation of savings and of net claims on the foreign region, Bt+1, from their
steady states are evaluated as  percentages of current expenditures, as their steady state
values might be zero. In this model, the change in Bt+1 from its steady state value is the home
region’s current account balance with regard to the foreign regions, which together with its
foreign-region counterpart sums to zero,
An asymmetric shock in this model is a pair (â, â
*) of productivity shocks at time t such
that â = -â
*.  Wage stickiness implies a short run adjustment in prices proportional to this
shock, 
In this economy, the new steady state is achieved in one period after a single period
productivity shock, so that the economy is in a new steady state in period t+1.  We analyze the
deviations of variables in both periods t and t+1 from the original steady state.
To analyze the effects of this shock on the two economies, it is convenient to first
derive its impact on current savings in the home region,13
ˆ c’ADS, (20)
ˆ y ’ (2(&1)ˆ c % 2(1&()((2%2()ˆ a,












For now, we let " = "
*, so that A > 0. If ((2+2
*)$1, a positive productivity shock in the home
economy increases home savings.  The money market equilibrium condition, money demand
equations and Euler equations together imply that the real rate of interest is constant and
consumption in each country changes by the same percentage in period t and period t+1.  
Home consumption in the short run and new steady state increases by
where D=(1-$)/$ equals the equilibrium real interest rate. Finally, the home region’s short-run
output and employment change by
A first result from these equations is that asymmetric shocks affect consumption and saving
only if the demand side is asymmetric.  Consider a symmetric monetary union in which the
expenditure shares of both goods are the same in both regions, ( = 0.5, and the elasticity of
substitution between the two goods is the same, 2 = 2
*.  Further, assume unitary elasticities
of substitution; that is, consumer preferences are Cobb-Douglas. We observe from (19) and
(20) that aggregate consumption and saving in the home region are unaffected by the shock.
Output increases in the home region and decreases in the foreign, but employment remains
the same in each.  Thus, consumers in each of the two regions simply substitute home goods
for foreign goods in the same quantities.
With enough asymmetry on the demand side, asymmetric shocks affect consumption,14
savings, and employment. Let ( > (2+2
*)
-1 and 2, 2
* > 1. This assures that the average elasticity
of substitution exceeds unity and that the home goods bias in consumption is sufficiently large.
In this case, home consumption and savings increase, while foreign savings and consumption
decrease as a result of a positive asymmetric shock to the home region. Output in the home
region increases by more than in the symmetric case, and increases more in relative terms
than the productivity gain caused by the shock. In the foreign region, output falls
correspondingly. 
In equilibrium, the relative price of the home good falls due to the positive productivity
shock. This causes consumers in both regions to substitute the foreign good for the home
good. To realize this, foreign consumers must dissave, causing a current account deficit vis-a-
vis the home region. Thus, domestic wealth increases and foreign wealth declines. The
consumption effect in the home region reflects this increase in wealth. Steady state
consumption goes up by the same amount. 
The short-run response of home employment is more ambiguous. For sufficiently large
elasticities of substitution and a sufficiently large home goods bias, 2(1-()((2+2
*)>1, the
increase in demand for the home good is large enough to make firms demand additional labor.
For a range of substitution elasticities given by [2((1-()]
-1 > 2(2+2
* ) > (
-1 , consumption
responds positively to a positive asymmetric shock and partially offsets the negative response
of home employment to this shock. In this case, the increase in labor productivity exceeds the
increase in the demand for home goods, with the result that firms reduce their demand for
labor in equilibrium. Finally, if 2(1-()((2+2
*) < 1, both consumption and employment decline in
response to an asymmetric shock.
Note, finally, that asymmetric shocks have permanent effects on output and
employment, although the shocks themselves are purely transitory. To see this, assume again
that ((2+2
*) > 1, i.e., the foreign demand for home goods goes up in response to an
asymmetric shock, and the foreign region runs a current account deficit. To pay for its15
ˆ y ’ ˆ a; ˆ y ( ’ & ˆ a . (22)
increased liabilities in the new steady state, the foreign region must permanently produce
more, while the home region produces less in the new steady state.  While total output is the
same in the new and in the old steady state, foreign goods are a larger share of total output.
Consequently, steady-state employment falls in the home region and rises in the foreign
region. 
IV. Government Taxes and Transfers to Offset Asymmetric Shocks 
We can now use the model to evaluate the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policies
aiming to offset the effects of asymmetric shocks on the two economies. In our framework,
such policies might target the stabilization of either regional employment, regional output, or
regional  consumption. Since the basic distortion in both economies, wage rigidity, is of a
Keynesian flavor, we consider the cases of employment stabilization and consumption-risk
sharing in this paper. We also consider two methods for regional governments to achieve
stabilization: a scheme of lump-sum collected and transfers paid directly from and to the
households in the two regions, and intergovernmental transfers that serve to redistribute
government expenditures between the two regions.
IV.1. Transfers Between Households
First, we consider a tax and transfer scheme that is chosen to keep employment in
each region unaffected by the asymmetric shock. Transfers are paid out directly to individual
consumers, entering their budget constraint. Since, in both regions, the relative change in
employment equals the relative change in output less the asymmetric shock, the transfers must
be chosen so that short-run outputs are 16
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From the previous section we know that this holds automatically when the elasticities of
substitution are unitary and the expenditure shares for home and foreign goods are equal in
both regions.  With asymmetries on the demand side, however, the transfer scheme must be
designed so that any additional effect on output is eliminated. Because output is demand
determined in the short run, such additional output effects work through final goods demand.
From (21), the direct effect of a positive asymmetric shock on employment  is positive
and stabilizing employment calls for a decline in home consumption, when 2((1-()(2+2
*) > 1.
Since taxes and transfers only affect employment by changing the distribution of aggregate
consumption spending across home and foreign goods, they must be chosen so that the
consumption effects offset the direct effect of the asymmetric shock on employment,    
We also have that savings in period t is given by
An increase in taxes reduces net wealth in the home region, which reduces both saving and
consumption. Combining (20), (23), and (24) yields 
Solving for the change in lump-sum transfers from the home region to the foreign
region, we obtain the transfer scheme that holds employment constant in both regions:17
DAm4((1&() [2m&1]
1&4((1&()2m




Equation (26) relates the transfer paid by the home region to the asymmetric shock
realized in period t.  Depending on the parameters of consumption demand, this transfer can
be positive or negative in response to a positive shock hitting the home economy. Define the
value 22m 0 [( 
-1 , (2((1-())
-1] by
For values of 2+2
* > 22m, the home region pays a transfer to the foreign region in response to
a positive, asymmetric; otherwise it receives a transfer. Unless the demand parameters satisfy
the condition ( 
-1 < (2+2
*) < (2((1-())
-1, this transfer is large enough to reverse the sign of the
response of savings and consumption to a positive asymmetric shock negative.  Because
steady-state consumption changes one-for-one with short-run consumption, the implication is
that, under the same condition, the scheme also reverses the long-run distributions effect of
temporary asymmetric shocks between the two regions.  
  Finally, if the elasticities of substitution are either small,  2+2
* # 22m, or sufficiently large,
the tax-transfer scheme increases the absolute value of the change in consumption in
response to the asymmetric shock in each region.  Only for an intermediate interval in which
the average elasticity of substitution exceeds unity but is not too large, the tax- transfer
scheme stabilizing regional employment reduces the impact of the shock on consumption.
The important implication is that the welfare effects of the fiscal arrangement between
the two regions are ambiguous.  An increase in the absolute value of the change in home
consumption in response to an asymmetric shock implies that the difference between
consumption in the two regions increases.  For values of the demand parameters, (, 2 and 2
*
, for which this happens, the transfer scheme reduces an equally-weighted sum of the
consumption portions of the utilities of the two regions for a given shock.  This means that the
expected utility (ex ante) from consumption for either region is lower under the transfer scheme18
T % T ( ’ G % G (, (28)
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if the shock, â, is a random variable with zero mean.  Equivalently, if the utility parameters
weighting leisure consumption, 6 and 6
*, are small, the transfer scheme that stabilizes
employment will lower expected utility for each region for values of (2+2
*) sufficiently large or
less than 22m. 
IV.2. Intergovernmental Transfers
Instead of taxing and paying transfers to individuals, schemes of horizontal fiscal
equalization often provide revenue sharing among regional governments:  governments in one
region pay for expenditures of governments in other regions.  In our framework, we can
analyze this alternative by assuming that taxes remain constant in the two regions, but
government spending adjusts in response to asymmetric shocks. Changes in regional public
expenditures are made possible through interjurisdictional grants such that the aggregate
public sector budget is balanced in every period, 
so that ￿ + ￿
* = 0. The equilibrium condition for home goods implies
This leads to the policy rule for stabilizing employment in the two regions through aggregate
demand management using public expenditures given by 
Note that the changes in government spending in the two regions are related to the transfers
between households analyzed above by the factor -DA/(1+DA).  In response to a positive19
asymmetric shock that raises domestic consumption, the government of the home region
reduces spending and uses its revenue surplus to pay a transfer to the foreign region’
government which is used to raise foreign public spending by the same amount.  In contrast
to the pure tax-transfer rule considered in the previous section, consumption and saving do
increase in the home region under this rule.  Government expenditures enter household utility
as public goods spending.  Therefore, a reduction in government spending reduces welfare
in the home region.  The welfare effects of intergovernmental transfers depend critically on the
relative weight of public goods spending compared to private consumption expenditures in the
utility function. 
A second difference between the two schemes is that the intergovernmental transfers
do not affect the response of savings to asymmetric shocks in equilibrium.  This holds because
short-run output is demand determined in the presence of temporary wage rigidities and
monopolistic competition so that an increase in government demand directly raises short-run
output.  There are no wealth effects, hence no savings impacts, of government spending when
the taxes imposed on households are unchanged.  By contrast, the scheme of transfers
between households changes household permanent income, hence savings and future
consumption.  Under government to government transfers, the net effect of a positive
asymmetric shock is to raise levels of consumption, leisure, and welfare in the new steady
state for the home region.
Finally, comparing equation (30) with equation (26) reveals that the absolute value of
intergovernmental transfers is smaller than the absolute value of transfers paid to households
to achieve the same degree of employment stabilization in the two regions. The reason is that
transfers to individuals have wealth effects, implying that households use these transfers partly
to consume more, partly to save more. Thus, the impact on current aggregate demand is
greater if given size transfers are used to finance government spending than if they are paid
as transfers to households.  The policy implication is that intergovernmental transfers dominate20
ˆ T ’ [2((1&()(2%2
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transfers to individuals if it is desirable that the transfer scheme only affect employment in each
region temporarily and that smaller magnitude transfers are preferable.  In our model, all taxes
are lump-sum so that the size of the transfer to achieve the same ends does not matter, but
in a more general environment with distortionary taxation, it can be welfare-improving to
choose a policy that involves lower magnitude transfers.
IV. 3. Consumption Risk Sharing
An alternative objective of the design of a tax transfer system between the two regions
would be to stabilize consumption in the regions rather than employment. This requires setting
taxes and transfers so that consumption is left unaffected by the asymmetric shock. This can
be accomplished by choosing taxes and transfers so that any impact of the asymmetric shock
on saving in the two regions is exactly offset by the tax-transfer scheme. This requires
Compared to employment stabilization, a policy rule seeking to pool consumption risk implies
that taxes and transfers respond less to asymmetric shocks than under a rule aiming at
employment stabilization in the case that  2((1-()(2+2
*)>1.   A suggestive interpretation is that
the relatively weak response of interregional taxes and transfers to asymmetric shocks
observed in existing federations reflects a desire to stabilize consumption rather than
employment in practice. 
Any welfare ranking of the two approaches depends on the relative weights of
consumption and leisure in utility for the two regions. If the weights on leisure, 6 and 6
*, are
small, and the asymmetric shocks are mean zero, consumption-risk pooling is preferable in an
expected-utility sense. Furthermore, by eliminating any effect of asymmetric shocks on
savings, this rule also eliminates all long-run distributional consequences of transitory
asymmetric shocks between the two regions. That is, steady-state consumption for each region21
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is unaffected by the transitory shock under this tax-transfer scheme.
IV.4. Aggregate Implications of Regional Stabilization
An important paradigm underlying the current debate over monetary and fiscal policies
in the EMU, and one implicitly accepted in the discussion about fiscal federalism and monetary
union, is that aggregate macroeconomic stabilization of the monetary union can be separated
from economic stabilization in the regions. This paradigm is reflected in the widespread
proposition that the central bank of a monetary union should focus on stabilizing inflation (and,
perhaps, employment) for the monetary union as a whole, while the regional governments
should use their policy tools to combat any asymmetric shocks affecting output and
employment. Furthermore, the popular proposition holds, there is no need for policy
coordination among the central bank and the regional governments.
This proposition clearly assumes that asymmetric shocks have no bearing on the
aggregate performance of the monetary union; they have purely distributional effects. In our
model, this will be the case, if 
This condition requires the elasticities of labor supply, " and "
*, to be equal across regions.
Otherwise, aggregate output in the two regions will change, with the result that the aggregate
demand for money will change. This in turn will cause the aggregate price level and the
interest rate to change. Thus, the separability between aggregate stabilization and regional
stabilization depends critically on symmetry of the two regions on the supply side.
To explore the consequences of asymmetric labor supply elasticities, consider the
aggregate equilibrium inflation rate for the two regions. For simplicity, we assume that the two
regions are equal in size, so that they receive equal weights in computing aggregate price22






indices. Let P be the price index for the combined regions. We then have
The effect of asymmetric shocks between the regions on the aggregate rate of inflation for the
monetary union depends on how savings in each region respond to these shocks. We have
shown that savings respond to the asymmetric shocks except in the special case that demands
are symmetric and the elasticities of substitution are one.  Combining asymmetries on the
demand and on the supply side implies that aggregate and regional fluctuations are correlated,
and that aggregate and regional stabilization cannot be separated. If domestic saving
increases in response to a positive asymmetric shock, the correlation between domestic saving
and aggregate inflation depends on the difference between the labor supply elasticities.  The
correlation is is positive if the foreign labor supply elasticity exceeds the domestic elasticity.
Equation (33) shows that, under these circumstances, any tax and transfer scheme
between the regions that affects savings will interfere with the central bank’s policy to achieve
price stability at the aggregate level. One implication of our analysis is that regional
stabilization using intergovernmental transfers is neutral with regard to aggregate stabilization,
since intergovernmental transfers do not affect the response of regional rates of saving to
asymmetric shocks.  A second implication is that using taxes and transfers for the purpose of
consumption-risk sharing helps aggregate stabilization, since consumption-risk sharing
requires the use of taxes and transfers to offset any response of domestic savings to
asymmetric shocks.
When the goal of regional stabilization is to stabilize regional employment, the tax-
transfer scheme may increase or reduce the response of household savings to asymmetric
shocks, depending on the parameters of demand.  If it increases the absolute value of the
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given distribution of asymmetric shocks, â. Specifically, regional employment stabilization
increases the variability of savings in response to asymmetric productivity shocks and, hence,
the variability of inflation for the monetary union as a whole if either ((2+2
*) < 1 or  
These relationships are derived from equations (19) and (24). The second term in inequality
(34) exceeds unity when the expenditure share of home goods, (, is greater than one-half.
Thus, while the increase in the variance of aggregate inflation due to asymmetric productivity
shocks depends on the degree to which labor supply elasticities differ, the sign of the
correlation between aggregate inflation and home productivity shocks depends on the demand
elasticities, expenditure shares, and the relative labor supply elasticities.
V. Regional Stabilization Policies and Incentives for Structural Reforms
An important objection against the creation of a system of taxes and transfers
responding to asymmetric shocks in a monetary union is that this might reduce the incentives
of the regional governments to undertake structural reform policies making their economies
fit for coping with such shocks.  Persson and Tabellini (1996), for example, argue that the
availability of fiscal insurance against asymmetric shocks would induce regional governments
to invest less in projects improving their economies’ shock absorbing capacity.  These authors
conclude that, in the presence of such adverse incentive effects, the implementation of fiscal
insurance against asymmetric shocks would call for the creation of federal grants subsidizing
such projects in the regions to assure a sufficiently high level of investment in shock absorbing
capacity.  In a similar vein, one might argue that structural reform improving the flexibility of
regional markets are politically costly for the governments, and that the availability of transfers
in times of bad asymmetric shocks reduces the political incentives to engage in reforms.24
While the analysis of the incentives for reform is beyond the scope of this paper, our
model can shed some light on these issues.  A first way to think about reforms making regional
markets more flexible is to consider the properties of the intermediate goods market.  Recall
that producers in these markets act under conditions of imperfect competition. The elasticity
of substitution between any two intermediate goods can be regarded as a measure of market
rigidities: the larger the elasticity of substitution, the more intense competition is among
producers in this market.  Thus, structural reforms to overcome market rigidities may aim at
increasing the substitutability between intermediate inputs. Intuitively, reducing product
regulation and the protection of producers against market entry, now often called for in the EU
would fall under this type of structural reform. 
Do structural policies of this kind increase the shock-absorbing capacities of the
regional economies?  In our model economy, the elasticity of substitution between intermediate
inputs does not affect the parameters determining the transmission of asymmetric shocks to
output, employment, savings and consumption.  This implies these types of reform policies and
fiscal insurance against asymmetric shocks are unrelated to the policy issues in this paper. 
A second way to think about structural reforms using this model concerns the elasticity
of labor supply.  Intuitively, labor market regulations may reduce the elasticity of labor supply,
as they increase reservation wages as well as search costs.  Alternatively, the equilibrium labor
supply elasticity may be raised by imperfect competition in the labor market, due, for example,
to unionization.   While the details of such effects are clearly beyond the scope of our model,
we can ask how policies aiming at increasing the elasticity of labor supply, ", affect the
transmission of asymmetric shocks.
To derive an answer, we note that the labor supply elasticity enters the transmission
of asymmetric shocks to regional employment through the composite parameter A in equation
(20) above. Taking derivatives, we find that A always increases with the home labor supply
elasticity.  Furthermore, increasing " raises the responsiveness of savings to a given25
asymmetric shock.  This means that the size of the response of consumption to the asymmetric
shock  rises as  " increases in the absence of fiscal policy interventions using a tax-transfer
scheme.    
With transfers collected and paid directly from and to households, however, the
responsiveness of consumption to the asymmetric shock is unaffected by changes in the labor
supply elasticity. The increase in A is exactly offset by a proportionate decrease in the absolute
value of savings using the relationship, ￿ = DAS.  Thus, the tax-transfer scheme eliminates any
impact of labor market reforms on the variability of consumption. In contrast, with
intergovernmental  transfers, the response of consumption to asymmetric shocks shocks rises
as " increases. Thus, the variability of consumption rises under the alternative employment-
stabilizing intergovernmental transfer scheme.   
Furthermore, equation (31) implies that the size of intergovernmental transfers  for the
purpose of employment stabilization decreases as A increases.  The effect of an increase in
the labor supply elasticity on the size of transfers between households depends on whether
post-transfer savings are positive or negative. If post-transfer savings are negative in response
to a positive asymmetric shock ( 2+2
* > (4((1 - ())
-1, the size of the transfers paid to households
decreases as the elasticity of labor supply rises.  This is also true when the transfers made by
the home region are negative, which is the case if ( 2+2
* < 2m).  However, for the intermediate
case, 2m < 2+2
* < (4((1 - ())
-1, an increase in the labor supply elasticity, ", raises the absolute
value of transfers.  This means the volume of transfers, whether made between households
or between governments, is sensitive to labor market reforms.26
We summarize these effects in the following table:
Effect of an increase in labor supply elasticity on transfer
size
Case Transfers between households Intergovernmental transfers 
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-1 fall fall
It is reasonable to think that governments considering structural reform policies will be
concerned with two issues in our context:  the impact on the variability of consumption and the
effects on the size of transfers that each government expects to pay or receive in response
to  asymmetric shocks. The table implies that the incentives to undertake structural reforms
from this point of view depend on the share of home goods in consumption expenditures, the
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, and on the type of fiscal tax-transfer
mechanism implemented to absorb the effect of asymmetric shocks on regional employment.
When a structural reform is defined as an increase in the elasticity of labor supply,
reforms always increase the variability of consumption absent any fiscal insurance scheme or
under the government expenditure redistribution scheme in response to asymmetric
productivity shocks.  On the other hand, such reforms reduce the magnitude of transfers made
under the government expenditure scheme in the case that net positive payments are made
by regions realizing positive shocks.  Therefore, regional governments may choose labor
market policies that reduce the cost of an employment stabilizing transfer scheme but also lead
to higher consumption variability. 
For the tax and transfer scheme between households, consumption variability is
unaffected by increases in the labor supply elasticity. Such reforms reduce the size of
employment-stabilizing  transfers except in case II, which applies when the elasticities of
substitution in consumption exceed unity but are not too large.  In cases I and III, increasing
the elasticity of labor supply is consistent with reducing inter-household transfers across27
regions.  In case II, these two goals would be in conflict. 
We can interpret these policy conflicts and complementarities by observing that the
degree of substitutability between the two region’s final goods may increase as economies
become more specialized in production as a consequence of economic integration.
Furthermore, integration and specialization should reduce the expenditure share of home
goods in home consumptions.  Trade integration can change the incentives for structural
reforms in this model economy.  Our results suggest that the incentives to undertake structural
reforms are more likely to be negatively affected by a fiscal transfer scheme when the
monetary union consists of relatively similar regions with a low degree of trade integration (this
makes case II more robust). In contrast, the incentive effects may turn positive, if the monetary
union consists of sufficiently dissimilar regions with a sufficiently high degree of trade
integration.
Finally, we recall from equation (30) that large differences in the regional labor supply
elasticities turn purely asymmetric shocks into aggregate shocks to the common inflation rate.
In the current context, this means that regional reform policies have consequences for the
aggregate performance of the monetary union. The suggestive implication is that regional
reform policies in a monetary union should be coordinated among the governments to avoid
adverse consequences for the aggregate performance of the union. 
VI. Conclusions
Almost 40 years ago, Mundell argued that a monetary union requires fiscal shock
absorber mechanisms to deal with asymmetric shocks. Empirical evidence, however, indicates
that fiscal shock absorbers in existing monetary unions are quite small. In this paper, we have
developed a macro economic model of a monetary union to revisit Mundell’s argument. In
contrast to Mundell’s Keynesian framework, we propose a dynamic general equilibrium
framework where imperfect competition in goods markets and sticky wages are the basis for28
aggregate demand policies having effects on real output and employment. 
In this model, purely transitory, asymmetric shocks affect regional output and
employment provided that there is sufficient asymmetry in the economic structures describing
the demand side. Furthermore, if there is structural asymmetry also in the labor markets of the
regional economies, asymmetric shocks between the regions have aggregate effects on the
performance of the monetary union as a whole. In the presence of demand asymmetries,
transitory shocks have wealth effects with lasting distributional consequences among the
regions. 
To cope with these shocks, we have considered taxes and transfers paid to households
and intergovernmental transfers. Both can be designed to stabilize regional employment, yet
with different distributional and welfare consequences. Taxes and transfers paid to households
can also be used to provide full consumption risk insurance between the regions. However,
fiscal insurance restricted to one instrument (implied by budget balance) cannot aim at
stabilizing consumption and employment at the same time. Our model implies that fiscal
policies aiming at stabilizing regional employment may well have negative welfare effects in
expected value. Overall, the welfare effects of fiscal insurance are quite ambiguous. This may
be the main reason why, in contrast to Mundell’s claim and popular arguments in the policy
debate, we do not more substantial fiscal insurance against asymmetric shocks in existing
monetary union.
Finally, we have analyzed the interaction between regional reform policies aiming at
increased goods and labor market flexibility, and fiscal insurance against asymmetric shocks.
While a detailed analysis of this interaction would require a model of political economy and
reform, which is beyond the scope of this paper, our model allows us to derive some
suggestions. One is that the type of reform matters. Deregulation of intermediate goods
markets is an issue orthogonal to fiscal insurance in this framework, labor market reform is not.
Another one is that the interaction between labor market policies and fiscal insurance depends29
critically on the degree of trade integration among the regions; it is positive with high and
negative with low degrees of integration. Finally, regional reform policies have consequences
for the aggregate performance of the union. This suggests that such policies should be
coordinated among the governments pertaining in a monetary union.
The last three results have clear implications for fiscal federalism in the broad sense
of the term, that is, the assignment problem of different functions of government to different
levels of government (see von Hagen, 1993). Specifically, the adoption of a common currency
among a set of highly integrated regions implies that governments of these regions should no
longer regard policies aiming at structural reforms of their local goods and labor markets as
matters of purely regional concern.30
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